We represent properties of actions in a logic programming language that uses both classical negation and negation as failure.
Introduction
This paper extends the work of Eshghi and Kowalski [6] , Evans [7] and Apt and Bezem [1] on representing properties of actions in logic programming languages with negation as failure.
Our goal is to overcome some of the limitations of the earlier work. The existing formalizations of action in logic programming are adequate for only the simplest kind of temporal reasoning|\temporal projection." In a temporal projection problem, we are given a description of the initial state of the world, and use properties of actions to determine what the world will look like after a series of actions is performed. Moreover, the existing formalizations can be used for temporal projection only in the cases when the given description of the initial state is complete. The reason for that is that these formalizations use the semantics of logic programming which automatically apply the \closed world assumption" to each predicate.
We are interested here in temporal reasoning of a more general kind, when the values of some uents 1 in one or more situations are given, and the goal is to derive other facts about the values of uents. Besides temporal projection, this class of reasoning problems includes, for instance, the cases when we want to use information about the current state of the world for answering questions about the past. 2 The view of logic programming accepted in this paper is strictly declarative. The adequacy of a representation of a body of knowledge in a logic programming language means, to us, adequacy with respect to the declarative semantics of that language. In fact, the language of \extended logic programs" used in this paper is a subset of the system of default logic from [30] , and our work can be viewed as a development of the approach to temporal reasoning based on nonnormal defaults [25] . The possibility of using the logic programs proposed in this paper for the automation of temporal reasoning, based on program transformations and the XOLDTNF metainterpreter [4] , is demonstrated in the forthcoming paper [20] .
Two parts of this paper may be of more general interest. First, we introduce here a simple declarative language for describing actions, called A. Traditionally, ideas on representing properties of actions in classical logic or nonmonotonic formalisms are explained on specic examples, such as the \Yale shooting problem" from [14] . Competing approaches are evaluated and compared in terms of their ability to handle such examples. We propose to supplement the use of examples by a dierent method. A particular methodology for representing action can be formally described as a translation from A, or from a subset or a superset of A, into a \target language"|for instance, into a language based on classical logic or on circumscription, or into a logic programming language. Our method for describing properties of actions in logic programming is presented here as a translation from A into the language of extended logic programs, and its soundness is the main technical result of the paper. A counterexample is given showing that the translation is incomplete. A possible way of achieving completeness is discussed in the last section. Second, the proof of the main theorem depends on a relationship between stable models [11] and signings [18] , that may be interesting as a part of the general theory of logic programming.
The language A is introduced in Section 2, and Section 3 is a brief review of extended logic programs. Our translation from A into logic programming is dened in Section 4, and the soundness theorem is stated in Section 5. Section 6 contains the lemmas that relate stable models to signings, and in Section 7 the proof of the soundness theorem is presented.
A Language for Describing Actions
A description of an action domain in the language A consists of \proposi-tions" of two kinds. A \value proposition" species the value of a uent in a particular situation|either in the initial situation, or after performing a sequence of actions. An \eect proposition" describes the eect of an action on a uent. Note that the last proposition diers from (3) by the order in which the two actions are executed. This example illustrates the possibility of reasoning about alternative \possible futures" of the initial situation.
The language A is adequate for formalizing several interesting domains.
Note that the domains from Examples 1{3, although very simple, have been actually proposed in the literature as counterexamples demonstrating the inadequacy and limitations of some earlier approaches to formalizing action.
In many respects, however, the expressive power of A is rather limited. Some ways of extending A are mentioned in Section 8.
The programming system can produce only one of two answers, yes or no; it will never tell us that the truth value of the query cannot be determined on the basis of the information included in the program.
Extended logic programs, introduced in [12] , are, in this sense, dierent. The language of extended programs distinguishes between negation as failure not and classical negation :. The expression :A, where A is an atom, means, intuitively, \A is false"; the expression not A is interpreted as \there is no evidence that A is true." There is a clear dierence between these two assertions if the program gives no information about the truth value of A.
The general form of an extended rule is The semantics of extended logic programs denes when a set of ground literals is an answer set of a program [12] . A rule with variables is treated as shorthand for the set of its ground instances. For extended programs without variables, answer sets are dened in two steps.
First, let 5 be an extended program without variables that doesn't contain not. The answer set of 5 is the smallest set S of ground literals such that (ii) all expressions of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
Clearly, 5 S doesn't contain not, so that its answer set is already dened. If this answer set coincides with S, then we say that S is an answer set of 5.
It is easy to check, for instance, that the program (5) has one answer set, fp; :q; t; ug.
The answer sets of a program can be easily characterized in terms of default logic. We will identify the rule (4) Two other approaches to the semantics of logic programs with two kinds of negation are proposed in [29] and [28] . In the context of this paper, they can be shown to lead to the same result as the answer set semantics.
Describing Actions by Logic Programs
Now we are ready to dene the translation from A into the language of extended programs.
About two dierent eect propositions we say that they are similar if they dier only by their preconditions. Our translation method is dened for any domain description that does not contain similar eect propositions. 4 Its only situation constant is S0; its uent constants and action constants are, respectively, the uent names and action names of D. There are also some predicate and function symbols; the sorts of their arguments and values will be clear from their use in the rules below.
The program D will consist of the translations of the individual propositions from D and the four standard rules: \from the past to the future": the rst|when a uent is known to be true in the past, and the second|when it is known to be false. The rules (8) play the same role for reasoning \from the future to the past." The auxiliary predicate Noninertial is essentially an \abnormality predicate" [22] . Now we will dene how translates value propositions and eect propositions. The following notation will be useful: 14
The translation of an eect proposition (2) consists of 2n + 2 rules. The rst of them is Holds(F; Result(A; s)) Holds(P 1 ; s); : : : ; Holds(P n ; s): (10) It allows us to prove that F will hold after A, if the preconditions are satised. The second rule is Noninertial (jFj; A; s) not Holds(P 1 ; s); : : : ; not Holds(P n ; s) (11) (Holds(P i ; s) is the literal complementary to Holds(P i ; s).) It disables the inertia rules (7), (8) in the cases when f can be aected by a. Without this rule, the program would be contradictory: We would prove, using a rule of the form (10) , that an unloaded gun becomes loaded after the action Load, and also, using the second of the rules (7) , that it remains unloaded! Note the use of not in (11) . We want to disable the inertia rules not only when the preconditions for the change in the value of F are known to hold, but whenever there is no evidence that they do not hold. If, for instance, we do not know whether Loaded currently holds, then we do not want to conclude by inertia that the value of Alive will remain the same after Shoot. We cannot draw any conclusions about the new value of Alive. If we replaced the body of (11) by Holds(P 1 ; s); : : : ; Holds(P n ; s), the translation would become unsound.
Besides (10) and (11), the translation of (2) 
The rules (12) justify the following form of reasoning: If the value of F has changed after performing A, then we can conclude that the preconditions were satised when A was performed. These rules would be unsound in the presence of similar propositions. The rules (13) allow us to conclude that a precondition was false from the fact that performing an action did not lead to the result described by an eect axiom, while all other preconditions were true. We will illustrate the translation process by applying it to Yale Shooting (Example 2). The translation of that domain includes, in addition to (7) It is instructive to compare this set of rules with the formalization of Yale Shooting given by Apt and Bezem [1] , who were only interested in temporal projection problems, and did not use classical negation. Instead of our four inertia rules, they have one, corresponding to the rst of the rules (7 For an inconsistent D, the statement of the soundness theorem is trivial, because such D entails every value proposition. For consistent domain descriptions, the statement of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the following lemma, which will be proved in Section 7:
Soundness Lemma. Let D be a consistent domain description without similar eect propositions. There exists an answer set Z of D such that, for any value proposition P , if P 2 Z then D entails P .
Note that the lemma asserts the possibility of selecting Z uniformly for all P ; this is more than is required for the soundness theorem.
The set Z from the statement of the lemma is obviously consistent, because a consistent domain description cannot entail two complementary value propositions. Consequently, if D is consistent and does not include similar value propositions, then D has a consistent answer set.
The converse of the soundness theorem does not hold, so that the translation is incomplete. This following simple counterexample belongs to Thomas Woo (personal communication). Let D be the domain with one uent name F and one action name A, characterized by two propositions:
It is clear that D entails initially F . But the translation of this proposition, Holds(F; S0), is not entailed by D. Indeed, it is easy to verify that the set of all positive ground literals other than Holds(F; S0) is an answer set of D.
Answer Sets and Signings
To prove the soundness lemma, we need the following denition. Let 5 be a general logic program (that is, an extended program that does not contain classical negation). A signing for 5 is any set S of ground atoms such that, for any ground instance In this section we show that the answer sets of a general program 5 which has a signing S can be characterized in terms of the xpoints of a monotone operator. Specically, for any set X of ground atoms, let X be the symmetric dierence of X and S:
Obviously, is one to one. Moreover, it is clear that is an involution:
= X: We will dene a monotone operator such that any X is an answer set of 5 if and only if X is a xpoint of .
Recall that, for general logic programs, the notion of an answer set (or \stable model") can be dened by means of the following construction [11] . Since is one-to-one and an involution, this is equivalent to Note that, since is an involution, Lemma 1 can be also stated as follows: X is an answer set of 5 i X = Y for some xpoint Y of . Lemma 2. The operator is monotone.
Proof. Let 5 1 be the set of all rules from 5 whose heads belong to S, and let 5 2 be the set of all remaining rules. Clearly, for any X, Consequently, for every X, In particular, It is clear from the denition of that X n S = X n S; X \ S = S n X:
We conclude that Since is monotone, and the reduct operators X 7 ! 5 X i are antimonotone, it follows that is monotone.
Having proved Lemmas 1 and 2, we can use properties of the xpoints of monotone operators given by the Knaster-Tarski theorem [34] to study the answer sets of a program with a signing. The Knaster-Tarski theorem asserts, for instance, that every monotone operator has a xpoint; this gives a new, and more direct, proof of the fact that every general program with a signing has at least one answer set. 6 Moreover, it asserts that a monotone operator has a least xpoint, which is also its least pre-xpoint. (A pre-xpoint of is any set X such that X X.) This characterization of the least xpoint of is used in the proof of the soundness lemma below.
Proof of the Soundness Lemma
The results of the previous section are not directly applicable to programs with classical negation. It is known, however, that any extended program 5 can be converted into a closely related program without classical negation, as follows [12] . For each predicate P occurring in 5, select a new predicate P 0 of the same arity. (4) (16) (The predicate symbol in the atom Holds(P k ; s) + is either Holds or Holds 0 , depending on whether or not P k includes a negation sign.)
In the rest of this section, D is a consistent domain description such that every two similar value propositions from D are disjoint, and 5 stands for the positive form of D.
Let S be the set of all ground atoms that contain the predicate symbol Noninertial . It is easy to see that S is a signing for 5. By and we denote the operators dened, for these 5 and S, as in the previous section. Recall that our goal is to nd an answer set Z of D such that, for any value proposition P , if P 2 Z, then D entails P . This set Z will be dened by the condition Z + = Y , where Y is the least xpoint of . It is easy to understand why this is a reasonable choice. Lemma 1 tells us that Y is an answer set of 5; it follows that Z is indeed an answer set of D (provided that it is consistent). On the other hand, since Y is the least xpoint of , Y includes \few" atoms beginning with Holds or Holds 0 (it is clear that such an atom belongs to Y i it belongs to Y ). For this reason, Z includes \few" literals with the predicate symbol Holds, which makes the assumption P 2 Z in the statement of the soundness lemma particlularly strong.
For any model M of D, let h(M) stand for the set of atoms of the form (P) + , where P is a value proposition that is true in M. It is clear that the predicate symbols in these atoms are Holds and Holds 0 . By n(M) we denote the set of atoms of the form Noninertial (17) are either both true in M or both false in M. Finally, dene
Note that X M n S = h(M) and S n X M = S n n(M), so that
Our goal is to show that X M is a pre-xpoint of , that is,
(Lemma 5 below). To this end, we will check that X M contains both X M \S and X M n S. 
If all atoms in the body of (21) belong to h(M), then all preconditions P 1 ; : : : ; P n hold in the state MÃ. Consequently, F holds in the state 8(A; MÃ), which means that the head of (21) 
Assume that both atoms in the body of (22) belong to h(M). Then F does not hold in the state MÃ and holds in the state 8(A; MÃ). It follows that D includes an eect proposition P 0 , describing the eect of A on F whose preconditions hold in MÃ. But the eect proposition P , from which R was generated, describes the eect of F on A also. Since D does not contain similar eect propositions, it follows that P = P 0 . Consequently, the preconditions of P hold in the state MÃ, and the head of (22) 
Assume that all atoms in the body of (23) belong to h(M). Then F does not holds in the state 8(A; MÃ). This is only possible when at least one of the preconditions P 1 ,: : :,P n does not hold in the state MÃ. But all preconditions other than P i hold in this state; consequently, P i does not hold, which means that the head of (23) Proof. By the denitions of and and Lemma 4,
From this inclusion and Lemma 3, Consequently,
Since the predicate symbol in (P) + is Holds or Holds 0 , it follows that (P) + 2 h(M), so that P is true in M. For instance, in [15] this approach is used to prove the equivalence of the methods for formalizing actions proposed earlier by Pednault [26] , Reiter [31] and Baker [2] for the domains representable in A.
On the other hand, this paper is one of the rst experiments (along with [17] , [27] , [10] ) on using extended logic programs for representing knowledge. Not much is known yet about mathematical properties of extended programs.
For this reason, in this initial experiment, the source language A was deliberately made quite simple, and we did not try to make the translation complete. As we have seen, even the soundness theorem limited to this class of domains turns out to be nontrivial.
The next step will be to make the translation complete and applicable to domain descriptions containing similar propositions. It appears that both goals can be achieved by using the more expressive language of disjunctive programs [12] as the target language for the translation. The head of a disjunctive rule is a list of literals separated by occurrences of the "epistemic disjunction" symbol j. For example, each of the rules (12) This will apparently eliminate the cases of incompleteness similar to the counterexample from the end of Section 5. Similarly, all n rules (13) can be replaced by the more intuitive disjunctive rule Holds(P 1 ; s) j : : : j Holds(P n ; s) Holds(F; Result(A; s)):
Another useful extension of this work made possible by using disjunctive rules has to do with disjunctive information about the initial situation. In the dialect of A that allows us to represent such information, a value proposition may include a disjunction of uent expressions (or, more generally, an arbitrary propositional combination of uent names) in place of a single uent expression. For instance, in a "Russian roulette" version of the shooting example, we have two guns, described by two uents, Loaded1 and Loaded2, and the initial condition can be initially Loaded1 _ Loaded2: (24) In the corresponding logic program, (24) will be represented by the disjunctive rule Holds(Loaded1; S0) j Holds(Loaded2; S0): Extending the semantics of A to this dialect is straightforward. However, generalizing the soundness theorem to disjunctive value propositions requires further work on the mathematics of disjunctive programs.
The shooting domain with several guns is one of the cases when \rst-order" notation would be more natural than the \propositional" notation of A. We can write initially Loaded(Gun1 ) _ Loaded(Gun2 ) instead of (24) , and express the main property of shooting by the schema Shoot(x) causes :Alive if Loaded(x); (25) where x is a metavariable for the expressions Gun1 , Gun2 . Thus (25) corresponding to the two instances of (25) .
We are working on developing extensions of A capable of expressing richer ontologies of actions.
The most striking limitation of A is its inability to express domain constraints. The uents represented in A are presumed to be independent, in the sense that the semantics of A treats any assignment of truth values to the uent constants as a valid state.
Syntactically, constraints will be expressed by propositions of the form always < formula > :
For instance, we can express that an object cannot occupy two locations at once by the proposition always :(At(x; l 1 )^At(x; l 2 )) for all x, l 1 , l 2 such that l 1 6 = l 2 . Semantically, including constraints will require that a state be dened as a truth assignment to the uent constants that makes all constraint formulas true. Another necessary change in the semantics is due to the fact that, in the presence of constraints, an action may have indirect eects. For instance, consider the action of moving x from l 1 to l 2 . If the only explicitly given eect of this action is that it makes At(x; l 2 ) true, we should be able to conclude that it also makes At(x; l 1 ) false (because otherwise a constraint would be violated).
We plan to design and investigate dialects of A in which nondeterministic actions can be described. In fact, nondeterminism is closely related to the idea of ramications, since the indirect eects of an action can be nondeterministic. Almost nothing is currently known about the frame problem in the presence of nondeterminism. One way to include nondeterminism is to allow eect propositions to contain disjunctions, for instance:
TossCoin causes Heads _ Tails:
Semantically, in either case, nondeterministic transition functions will be used. In the corresponding logic program, the eect of TossCoin will be expressed by a disjunctive rule.
In [3] , the extension of A is introduced in which one can describe the concurrent execution of actions. In this extension, performing several actions concurrently can be represented by using a set of action names instead of a single action name in a proposition, for instance:
Alive after fWaitg fShoot(Gun1); Load(Gun2 )g; and the semantics of A is generalized accordingly. The translation to logic programming presented here is extended to this \concurrent A" in the spirit of [13] .
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The inconsistency of the Stolen Car domain (Example 4) illustrates the fact that A cannot be used for representing \causal anomalies," or \miracles" [21] . We plan to address this issue in further work, too. Our preferred approach to causal anomalies is to view them as evidence of unknown events that occur concurrently with the given actions and contribute to the properties of the new situation.
One other dialect of A is described in [19] . It has symbols for temporal intervals over which actions may occur.
A referee has pointed out to us that there is a simple and elegant translation from A into a form of abductive logic programming with integrity constraints, which, inlike the method of [33] , handles all forms of temporal reasoning in a uniform way. It would be interesting to extend this translation to more expressive dialects of A also.
